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Type | Essay |
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Neuropsychological Functions Behind Humans’ Tendency to Anthropomorphize
Moral Disengagement T. Hartmann & P. Vorderer
also started to reveal the neuropsychological functions behind humans’ tendency to anthropomorphize things (Heberlein & Adolphs, 2004; Mar & Macrae, 2006). Computer game engineers and visual artists use this knowledge to create believable, human-like, anthropomorphic game characters. Contemporary design of computer characters applies the cues that researchers have suggested provoke automatic social responses. Such indicators include eye-gazing, biological motion, display of natural facial activity, display of emotions, as well as breathing, natural vocal tones, and display of intelligence (Gratch & Marsella, 2004; Holtgraves, Ross, Weywadt, & Han, 2007; Morrison & Ziemke, 2005; Shapiro, Peña, & Hancock, 2006).
Second, growing consensus among Communication Researchers and Media Psychologists suggests that users tend to approach media, including video games, as ‘‘believers.’’ Also, likely to be the result of automatic processes, users’ default mode of reception seems to perceive things as real, whereas it takes irritating media cues or motivational efforts to suspend the belief in an ‘‘apparent reality’’ (Green, Garst, & Brock, 2004; Wirth et al., 2007; Zillmann, 2006). If the media stimulus is well designed and displays social cues appropriately, it takes effort to recall that a character ‘‘is not real,’’ because automatic social perceptions suggest otherwise. For similar reasons, media users may respond to displayed characters affectively, even if it does not seem rational to do so (Morrison & Ziemke, 2005). As Zillmann (2006, p. 218) suggests, ‘‘the sequence of events, therefore, is not that cognizance of the pseudo reality of presentations has to be suppressed before emotions can occur, but that emotions are first induced by apparent reality, which then may be discounted as artificial.’’ Therefore, it seems likely that users tend to believe in displayed video game characters as well.
Third, even if users of a video game occasionally discount the perception of an ‘‘apparent reality,’’ it seems unlikely that they are continuously motivated to do so. Constant consideration that ‘‘this is not real’’ would distance the media user from the narrative and could eventually lead to emotional detachment (Cupchik, 2002; Vorderer, 1993). Video gamers, however, strive for entertainment, and heightened involvement or transportation into the mediated world increases their enjoyment (e.g., Sherry, 2004; Skalski, Lange, & Tamborini, 2006). If users continuously reminded themselves that ‘‘this is just a game,’’ the game would hardly be enjoyable (cf., Sheppes & Meiran, 2007, p. 1522). Therefore, because video gamers may be motivated to maintain belief in an apparent reality for self-serving reasons (unless strong aversive experiences urge them to do distance themselves; see below; see also Cantor, 2002; Schramm & Wirth, 2008), they may also be motivated to perceive video game characters as real social entities rather than artificial objects.
In the light of the above arguments, it seems reasonable to assume that users do confront ‘‘some sort of ’’ social entities, not simply objects, when they shoot video game characters. The knowledge that virtual characters are mediated and do not really exist is not completely forgotten. Rather, automatic processes and users’ motivational disposition ignore that information for the moment, so that users temporarily forget that their experience is mediated (International Society for
96 Journal of Communication 60 (2010) 94–119 © 2010 International Communication Association
Presence Research [ISPR], 2000). Lacking an existing term, we suggest that players
perceive video game characters as quasi-social (Hartmann, 2008). Virtual violence
thus, involves harm to quasi-social characters that potentially fall into ‘‘the scope of
justice’’ and have a ‘‘moral status’’ (Olthof et al., 2008; Pizarro, Detweiler-Bedell, &
Bloom, 2006; see Elton, 2000, for a philosophical discussion of the topic).
The question is why virtual violence obviously is enjoyable for many players. Our
suggestion contains two parts. First, virtual violence may be enjoyable because it offers
pleasurable gratifications. For example, players could perceive their effective harm-
doing as a proof of their own superiority. Researchers have argued that virtual violence
makes users feel effective and powerful (Klimmt & Hartmann, 2006), and allows
them to enact a male gender role (Jansz, 2005; Kirsh, 2003). Second, gratification
may be mood-regulation. Violent games offer pleasurable aesthetics of destruction
(Sparks & Sparks, 2000) and stimulate excitement (Raney, Smith, & Baker, 2006)
that can become pride or euphoria if the user experiences success (Grodal, 2000).
However, we assume that virtual violence is only enjoyable if it comes with no or
minimal costs, that is, if it does not violate inner moral standards and cause aversion
or dissonance (Bandura, 1990, 2002; Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). In general,
violence that conflicts with one’s inner moral standards triggers distressful concern
(cf., Bandura, 2002; Opotow, 1990). Guilt, for example, is defined ‘‘as the dysphoric
feeling associated with the recognition that one has violated a personally relevant
moral or social standard’’ (Kugler & Jones, 1992, p. 218). If a user violates his or her
internal moral standards by doing harm to video game characters, dissonant feelings
like guilt and disgust are likely to emerge (cf., Klimmt, Schmid, Nosper, Hartmann
& Vorderer, 2008; Tangney et al., 2007). Feelings of guilt or remorse, in turn, should
hinder enjoyment.
Interviewing heavy users of first-person shooters, Klimmt, Schmid, Nosper,
Hartmann, and Vorderer (2006) found that respondents are able to recall situations
of moral concern from video games, even though it was ‘‘just a game’’ (p. 322).
Players also reported that disturbing situations interfered with their enjoyment. For
example, one respondent mentioned that ‘‘if people [enemies] are not dead at once,
but somehow lie on the ground and are still moving and so on. That reaches a limit.’’
Another respondent reasoned that ‘‘If I think that I turn around a corner, and a child
is standing in front of me and as soon as he moves I, because I have this tunnel vision ‘if
it moves, shoot it,’ would shoot him, [. . .] that would counteract my fun very much.’’
Accordingly, the overall enjoyment of virtual violence in games may depend on
maximizing pleasurable gratifications and minimizing aversive costs. The current
studies focus on how violent games may minimize aversive costs by shaping their
users’ moral processing. Such games may reduce negative affect, particularly guilt,
and promote overall enjoyment of virtual violence.
Journal of Communication 60 (2010) 94–119 © 2010 International Communication Association 97
Moral Disengagement T. Hartmann & P. Vorderer
Moral disengagement in violent video games
A recent approach in communication research aims to explain the conditions of enjoyable versus aversive aspects of virtual violence through the study of moral disengagement in violent video games (Klimmt et al., 2008; see also Raney, 2004). This perspective argues that players try to avoid moral concern and related aversive feelings to maintain their entertainment experience. Moral disengagement supports this motivation. Moral disengagement can follow if the violent action is justifiable or if ‘‘considerations of fairness do not [seem to] apply to the other’’ (Opotow & Weiss, 2000, p. 479; i.e., the action is not considered harm-doing due to judgements about the target of harm). Moral disengagement requires that the aggressor cognitively removes the potential victim from his or her ‘‘scope of justice’’ (Opotow, 1990, p. 3; see also ‘‘moral status,’’ Olthof et al., 2008; ‘‘human essence,’’ Castano & Giner- Sorolla, 2006, p. 805; ‘‘dehumanization,’’ Haslam, 2006; ‘‘moral circle’’; Pizarro et al., 2006, p. 82). Moral disengagement results in dehumanization of a character and neglect of a character’s moral status and human essence (Haslam, 2006). Thus, moral disengagement eases harm-doing: ‘‘Those who are morally excluded are perceived as undeserving, expendable, and therefore eligible for harm’’ (Opotow, 1990, p. 13).
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