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The Moral-Sanction Theory of Delight and Repugnance
This notion of moral disengagement in video games shares many similarities with the moral-sanction theory of delight and repugnance (Zillmann, 2000) and the disparagement/disposition theory of drama (see also Raney, 2004; Zillmann & Cantor, 1976). Both disposition theories argue that users are counterempathetic toward characters they dislike. According to both theories, characters are disliked if they display immoral behavior (Raney & Bryant, 2002). Depending on the severity of a character’s misconduct, users deem a certain punishment of the character appropriate (and even enjoyable) if it restores justice (Raney, 2002, 2004; Zillmann & Bryant, 1975; Zillmann, Bryant, & Cantor, 1974). Rephrased in the light of the present approach, a character’s misconduct defines the extent to which it falls within or beyond the ‘‘scope of justice.’’ The more severe a character’s misconduct, the harsher the punishment that is still considered just.
The moral-disengagement approach proposes that most people who play violent video games do not enjoy behaving aggressively in normal real-world situations, because actual social entities fall into their ‘‘scope of justice.’’ Therefore, it is not due to dysfunctional personality traits that players enjoy virtual violence. Rather, the game creates a situation that automatically leads to cognitive disengagement from inner moral standards (cf., Bandura, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Opotow, 1990). Like real people, quasi-social video game characters may trigger social perception, display humane emotions, and even evoke empathetic feelings. Thus, they have the potential to be considered part of the moral community. As a result, harming quasi-social characters could be perceived as wrongdoing. But, according to the moral disengagement perspective, features of the game ensure that it is not. Instead, as in other contexts that spur violence in real life, because of cues within video games, ‘‘behavior that is ordinarily viewed as unacceptable (killing social beings) is redefined as justified
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and desirable’’ (Klass, 1990, p.403). Due to its automaticity, moral disengagement is not necessarily a conscious process. Indeed, the significant phenomenology for users may be that virtual violence just does not feel wrong—instantaneously and without elaborate moral reasoning (Haidt, 2001). We propose two underlying mechanisms of moral disengagement that, we believe, are not mutually exclusive, but may function simultaneously in a given situation.
The first mechanism argues that specific moral disengagement cues the game provides may automatically separate users’ harm-doing from their inner moral standards (Bandura, 1990, 2002; Opotow, 1990). For example, moral disengagement cues, such as a good reason to fight (e.g., to save the world), particularly against nonanthropomorphic creatures (e.g., aliens), may frame violence against game characters as acceptable even though those characters are perceived as quasi-social entities (Haslam, 2006). Contemporary violent video games may incorporate moral disengagement cues (cf., Dill, Gentile, Richter, & Dill, 2005) so that players can enjoy virtual violence without moral concerns. Content analyses by Smith (2006) and Smith, Lachlan, and Tamborini (2003) revealed that the typical narrative in violent games is ‘‘a human perpetrator engaging in repeated acts of justified violence involving weapons that result in some bloodshed to the victim’’ (p. 60; emphasis by the authors). Although violent video games entertain users with increasingly realistic graphics (Krahé & Moeller, 2004), game designers seem to design violent game play to be enjoyably guilt-free.
The second mechanism that facilitates users’ moral disengagement during violent video game play involves processes that are more elaborate and reflective. If users’ automatic protections against violations of internal moral standards occasionally fail and guilty or remorseful feelings arise (cf., Haidt, 2001), they can still reframe their wrongdoing and regulate their dissonant state. To fuel this conscious moral rationalization (Tsang, 2002), users can actively recall that they are merely playing a game or that they are fighting for justice. Research by Ladas (2002) and Klimmt et al. (2006) suggests that players do engage in such processes to minimize unpleasant feelings that may emerge during play.
The current research
The nascent study of moral disengagement in violent video games largely consists of literature reviews and plausible assumptions, and thus requires empirical research. Exploratory interviews conducted by Klimmt et al. (2006) have shed some light on the second mechanism of conscious moral rationalization proposed. But the first mechanism proposed, that is, automatically induced moral disengagement, needs testing. The present studies investigate this mechanism of moral disengagement in violent video games by examining how specific game-based cues may frame aggression against quasi-social characters as justifiable.
Research suggests a variety of cues a situation may provide to frame violent acts as unproblematic (Bandura, 1990, 2002; Haslam, 2006; Opotow, 1990). These include
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the severity of opponents’ misconduct (violence may be appropriate if it follows condemnable misconduct by opponents), (b) dehumanization of victims (targets of violent actions are declared to lack human qualities), (c) moral justification (violence is considered as a necessary means to achieve a higher calling), and (d) disregard for or distortion of the consequences of violence (e.g., harsh and potentially disturbing consequences of violence are not portrayed or are visually masked). Two 2 × 2-experiments examined the effect of these moral-disengagement cues in contemporary violent video games on users’ feelings of guilt, general negative affect, and game enjoyment. Experiments took place in a lab at a university in the Western United States.
Experiment 1
Hypotheses The first 2 × 2-experiment examined the effects of dehumanization (human opponents vs. creatures) and condemnable misconduct (condemnable vs. less condemnable actions of opponents) on emotional outcomes from playing a vio- lent video game. Dehumanized entities do not fall into the perpetrator’s scope of justice (Haslam, 2006; Opotow, 1990; Raney, 2002; Zillmann, 2000), which is why harming them is not perceived as a problematic violation of norms (Bandura, 1990, 2002). For example, if an opponent appears to be nonhuman, moral concern should be diminished. Condemnable misconduct allows the user to justify aggression against a deserving target (self-righteous, advantageous comparison; Opotow, 1990). Accordingly, we hypothesized the following effects:
H1: Video game players whose opponents are nonhuman will (a) feel less guilty, (b) have less negative affect, and (c) enjoy the game more than players with human opponents.
H2: Video game players whose opponents display condemnable misconduct will (a) feel less guilty, (b) have less negative affect, (c) enjoy the game play more than players whose opponents display only a minor misconduct.
Method
Participants Undergraduate students enrolled in a class on media entertainment were recruited as participants. Students received course credit for their participation. Overall, 84 students participated in the experiment (51 females, 33 males; ages ranged between 17 and 25, M = 19.82). On average, students in the sample reported playing video games for about 50 minutes during the week (SD = 73 minutes) and for about 1 hour and 50 minutes on the weekend (SD = 2 hours and 12 minutes). Among the participants’ favorite genres were role-playing games (29.8%), followed by action- adventure (21.4%), and puzzle games (19%). Shooting-, war-, and combat-games were favorites of only a minority (3.6%).
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Materials In the experiment, subjects played an edited level of a first-person-shooter. Shooters are a typical genre of violent video games (Smith, 2006). The current study used a level from the popular shooter Half-Life II (Valve Software). However, the game was modified substantially for the experimental manipulation (cf., ‘‘modding,’’ cf. Postigo, 2007).
First, a new cover story was applied. Before the game play started, subjects saw an animated picture of their opponents (either a human soldier or a nonhuman creature). A cover story informed them that the opponents had invaded the streets of a midsize city. The story explained that opponents had either shot civilians and behaved aggressively (condemnable misconduct) or conducted a passive, defensive protest (minor misconduct). Finally, players learned that their job was to patrol the streets to restore order.
Processes of (de)humanization are affected by both an entity’s inner and outer human nature (cf., Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). To manipulate dehumanization in the present study, only the outer appearance of opponents was changed. While playing the video game, users either fought against soldiers with weapons (human opponents) or zombie-like creatures (nonhuman opponents). Opponents either behaved aggres- sively, killing civilians in the streets and attacking the user unprovoked (condemnable misconduct), or behaved more passively, by peacefully coexisting alongside civilians and only attacking if the player opened fire first (minor misconduct).
Video games are not enjoyable if they are too difficult or too easy (Klimmt, Hartmann, & Frey, 2007). The complicated game play originally present in Half Life II was modified to produce a game stimulus that was easy enough for inexperienced users, but also challenging enough for experienced ones. Users (a) could only shoot with one weapon (a gun), (b) had unlimited ammunition but needed to reload occasionally, and (c) could not die. Only the number of opponents shot (kill-counter) appeared on the screen.
Procedure After entering the lab, participants read and signed an informed consent form and were randomly assigned to one of the four experimental conditions. After sitting in front of a computer, they watched the introductory sequence and played the game for 10 minutes before the game automatically stopped. Subjects wore headphones while playing. After the game ended, a lab assistant noted the number on the kill- counter and switched the screen to an online questionnaire that assessed dependent constructs, treatment variables, control factors, and sociodemographic data (in this order). After completing the questionnaire, participants continued with the second experiment. Then, they received a debriefing and left. Overall, the lab session took about 45 minutes.
Measures Dependent variables included sense of guilt, general negative affect, and game enjoyment.
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State guilt was measured by applying three items of the Differential Emotions Scale (DES-IV; Izard, 1977; Kotsch, Gerbing, & Schwartz, 1982). Similar to most assessments of guilt, the scale was originally developed to measure enduring emotion- tendencies (cf., Kugler & Jones, 1992). The original scale asks people about how often in their daily life they ‘‘feel regret, sorry about something you did,’’ ‘‘feel like you did something wrong,’’ and ‘‘feel like you ought to be blamed for something’’ (1, rarely or never; 2, hardly ever; 3, sometimes; 4, often; 5, very often). By rephrasing the questionnaire to ask, ‘‘While playing the game, how often did you. . ., ’’ the same items could be retained to assess state guilt. Kugler and Jones (1992) found that the three items correlate well with other measures of state guilt. Still, to select the best measure, existing scales that measure state guilt were reviewed and compared to the three DES-IV items. Kugler and Jones (1992) review two alternative scales that assess state guilt, the Guilt Inventory (Jones, Schratter, & Kugler, 2000) and the Perceived Guilt Index (Otterbacher & Munz, 1973). The Perceived Guilt Index has rarely been used in the past, and psychometric data to assess the quality of the measure is scarce. In contrast, the psychometric quality of the Guilt Inventory has been proven. However, most of the 10 items of the state-subscale were not easily modifiable for the current setting (e.g., ‘‘Recently, my life would have been much better if only I hadn’t done what I did’’). Thus, the DES-IV items seemed most appropriate for assessing state guilt in the present studies. Items were compiled into a mean index, α = 0.93; M = 1.71; SD = 1.09.
The popular, short version of the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) was applied to assess users’ negative affect. The short version of the PANAS consists of 20 attributes. The 10 items that assess negative affect were further analyzed in this study (distressed, upset, guilty, scared, hostile, irritable, ashamed, nervous, jittery, afraid; all from 1, very slightly or not at all; 5, extremely). Items were summed to an index, α = 0.93; M = 19.46; SD = 9.31.1 Negative affect was positively correlated with guilt (r = 0.64; p < .01).
Enjoyment was measured with a five-item scale developed by Tauer and Harack- iewicz (1999) to assess intrinsic game enjoyment. Subjects reported how much they thought playing the video game was ‘‘very interesting,’’ ‘‘a boring activity’’ (rev), ‘‘enjoyable,’’ ‘‘a waste of time’’ (rev), and ‘‘fun’’ (1, totally disagree; 5, totally agree). Items were compiled into a mean index, α = .91; M = 2.99; SD = 1.09. Enjoy- ment did not significantly correlate with guilt (r = −1.9; p = .09), nor with general negative affect (r = −1.8; p = .11).
One question assessed the effectiveness of each manipulated factor. However, according to the theoretical approach, moral disengagement cues may trigger uncon- scious effects. Therefore, the treatment questions were considered not to be sufficient proof but additional information about the treatment’s effectiveness. To check the condemnable misconduct manipulation, subjects were asked to rate the behavior of opponents, ranging from (1) very defensive to (5) very aggressive (M = 3.35; SD = 1.44). To assess the dehumanization manipulation, subjects were asked to
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indicate how much they agreed that they fought against nonhuman creatures rather than against human beings (1, do not agree; 5, totally agree; M = 2.98; SD = 1.45).
Subjects’ familiarity with Half Life II (1, not at all; 5, very much M = 2.07; SD = 1.4) and the number of opponents shot (kill-counter; M = 40; SD = 12.48) were assessed as control factors. Two additional control factors were derived on the basis of the second mechanism suggested in the theoretical approach (i.e., conscious rationalization). Participants were asked how much they thought that ‘‘this is just a game’’ (1, not at all; 5, very much; M = 3.29; SD = 1.44) and their belief that ‘‘this is just an experiment in which they need to follow instructions’’ (1 not at all–5 very much; M = 2.7; SD = 1.23).2
Results
Treatment check Players who fought against nonhuman creatures did perceive the opponents to be less human (M = 3.38; SD = 1.61) than players who fought against human soldiers (M = 2.7; SD = 1.34; t(82) = 2.1; p < .05). Also, players in the ‘‘condemnable misconduct’’ condition perceived the opponents to be significantly more aggressive (M = 3.54; SD = 1.38) than users in the ‘‘minor misconduct’’ condition (M = 3.16; SD = 1.5). However, this difference did not reach significance; t (82) = 1.19; ns.
Control factors Control factors were analyzed if they (a) correlate with at least one of three dependent measures and (b) significantly differ among at least two experimental groups (which would tell about confounding factors that violated the random assignment principle). The more familiar subjects were with Half Life II, the less they felt guilty (r = −0.28, p < .05), the weaker their negative affect (r = −0.33; p < .01), and the more they enjoyed the game (r = 0.39; p < .01). Also, the more players thought that ‘‘this is just a game’’ (r = −0.24; p < .01), and the more they thought ‘‘this is just an experiment’’ (r = −0.34; p < .01), the lower their enjoyment. Despite the random assignment, experimental groups unfortunately significantly differed in how much they thought that ‘‘this is just an experiment.’’ Apparently, awareness was confounded with the experimental manipulation: Participants assigned to the condemnable misconduct conditions reported significantly higher levels of awareness that ‘‘this is just an experiment’’ than participants in the ‘‘minor misconduct’’ conditions (F(1, 84) = 5.35; p < .01).
Data analyses the treatment check did not support an effective manipulation of opponents’ misconduct. Therefore, hypotheses testing was conducted as follows: First, a 2 (condemnable misconduct vs. minor misconduct) × 2 (nonhuman opponents vs. human opponents) multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted with the original experimental groups as the independent factor, and guilt, negative
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emotions, and enjoyment as dependent variables. Second, the same MANOVA was calculated, but this time with a quasi-experimental misconduct factor (i.e., median split of ‘‘perceived aggressiveness of opponents’’ at 4) instead of the original factor.3
A 2 (condemnable misconduct vs. minor misconduct) × 2 (nonhuman oppo- nents vs. human opponents) MANOVA revealed no significant effects on guilt and enjoyment, and a small but significant effect of opponents’ misconduct on negative affect (F(1, 83) = 4.18; p < .05; η2part = 0.05). Subjects shooting defensive opponents that only committed minor misconduct reported more negative affect (M = 21.51; SD = 10.23) than subjects shooting aggressive opponents in the condemnable misconduct condition (M = 17.32; SD = 7.8). An exploratory MANOVA analysis of the 10 negative affect items revealed that users fighting against opponents in the minor misconduct condition reported to be more guilty, ashamed, nervous, and irritable than players fighting against opponents in the ‘‘condemnable misconduct’’ condition (all p < .05).
A second MANOVA with the original misconduct factor replaced by the quasi- experimental perceived aggressiveness factor yielded similar results.
Discussion
Overall, Study 1 suffered from some flaws. One of the two experimental factors, that is, opponents’ misconduct, was not successfully manipulated. In addition, participant’s awareness ‘‘that this is just an experiment where I have to follow instructions’’ did not only affect game enjoyment, but also differed significantly between conditions, suggesting a confounding factor that was affected by the manipulation. Therefore, the results obtained in Study 1 have rather exploratory value.
Dehumanization The data did not support H1: In the study, players who fought against nonhuman creatures did not feel less guilty, did not have less negative affect, and did not enjoy the game more than players who fought against human opponents. Thus, fighting against either virtual human soldiers or virtual creatures caused no difference in users’ moral perception. One explanation is that users may have always found opponents aggressive enough to deserve a violent response, and such a perception may have overruled any effect of the opponents’ human or nonhuman appearance (see ‘‘manipulation of misconduct,’’ below). An alternative and more general explanation could be that players lacked automatic social perception and did not consider any of the virtual opponents to fall within their scope of justice. Both mechanisms could explain why low sample means in guilt and negative affect were found, both in the group that fought against human soldiers and the one that fought against creatures. Overall, subjects barely felt guilty or experienced any negative affect. Due to this floor effect, the manipulation of opponents’ outer appearance had little variance to explain. A third possibility is that the manipulation of dehumanization may have failed. Only the outer appearance of opponents differed, but all opponents may have been
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sufficiently human-like. Although the applied treatment check suggests a successful manipulation, a more rigid test of ‘‘human essence’’ (Loughnan & Haslam, 2007) may have indicated that the social perception of creatures did not differ much from that of human opponents.
Condemnable misconduct H2 received only marginal support: Players who shot opponents that committed condemnable misconduct did not feel less guilty (measured by the DES-IV subscale), and did not enjoy the game more than players that shot less blameworthy opponents. However, players experienced more negative affect if they shoot opponents that can only be blamed for a minor misconduct. Players who shot less blameworthy characters felt more guilty, ashamed, nervous, and irritable (measured by the PANAS). One explanation is that this negative affect indeed resulted from a violation of moral standards, which was too insignificant, however, to induce stronger feelings of guilt that would have been detected by the applied multi-item DES-IV measure.
Manipulation of misconduct the failed treatment check of the manipulated opponents’ misconduct may point to a limitation of the experiment. The applied manipulation may have been ineffective. In the game, even the opponents envisioned to be defensive and subject to less blame were equipped with weapons, which they used after subjects opened fire. These counterattacks probably provided enough misconduct for players to perceive the opponents as aggressive and worthy of blame (cf., Bandura, 1990; Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006). Quasi-social entities that display some misconduct and even attack the user with weapons may also be easily categorized as a threatening outgroup (i.e., the enemy). Research shows that people perceive outgroups as less humane, and more animal-like and automata-like than their ingroups (Leyens et al., 2001; Loughnan & Haslam, 2007). However, because every opponent deserved blame, users across all groups may have felt justified in shooting characters (cf., Raney, 2002). This may have reduced potential differences in guilt, negative affect, and enjoyment.
Indeed, qualitative interviews have found that users of violent games feel displea- sure after accidentally killing game characters who are actually innocent, for example, bystanders who tried to avoid harm and did nothing wrong in the first place (like children or fleeing civilians; Klimmt et al., 2006). Future studies should, therefore, distinguish more carefully between opponents that are or are not deserving of blame (Pizarro et al., 2006).
Familiarity of game Zero-order correlations showed that familiarity with the game determines guilt, negative affect, and enjoyment when shooting quasi-social characters. The more familiar players were with the violent game Half Life II, the weaker their experience of guilt and negative affect, and the greater their enjoyment. Two explanations may account for this effect. Players who are familiar with Half Life II have probably
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played it before. Through repeated use of the game, players could have learned how to regulate their emotions and deal with potential violations of moral standards. It seems reasonable that experienced users of violent games develop and apply cognitive strategies that help to reduce negative affect and make violent conduct more gratifying (cf. ‘‘desensitization,’’ Carnagey, Anderson, & Bushman, 2006; Raney, 2004). Moral disengagement may be one such strategy. Cues the game provides, such as nonhuman characters, could promote users’ learning processes, but lose their former impact once players incorporate moral disengagement. A second and related explanation is that users’ personality factors, for example, low trait empathy (Davis, 1983) or low susceptibility to guilt (Tangney, Wagner, & Gramzow, 1992) jointly led to familiarity with Half Life II, diminished guilt and negative affect, and increased enjoyment of virtual violence. From this perspective, any correlation found would be completely mediated by personality factors. Moral disengagement cues from the game, such as nonhuman opponents, would have had little or no importance for the formation of guilt and negative affect. Instead, enduring personality factors may have determined whether a player perceived quasi-social characters to fall into the scope of justice (Opotow, 1990). The explanation of the link found between familiarity and guilt, neg- ative affect, and enjoyment is challenging. Future studies are needed to illuminate the link between users’ familiarity with a violent game and positive and negative affect.4
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