Order ID | 53563633773 |
Type | Essay |
Writer Level | Masters |
Style | APA |
Sources/References | 4 |
Perfect Number of Pages to Order | 5-10 Pages |
PHIL 406 Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Language
Due May 7th 5pm
Write a 7-10 page paper either on a topic below, or a topic of your choosing (if you want to write on a topic of your choosing, you should clear it with me first).
The paper should go beyond the explanations I gave in class, and make your own contribution. This can take different forms. It might be to offer an argument against a position we talked about in class. It might be to offer an argument in favour of a position we discussed. But it could also be some interpretive work. As we’ve seen, it can be difficult to figure out what Wittgenstein is trying to say. If you disagree with an interpretation I offered in class, or you have an idea about places where we didn’t reach a satisfying interpretation, the goal of your paper can be to offer a convincing interpretation of some aspect of Wittgenstein.
Submit your assignment via email (adgray@uic.edu) before 5pm on May 7th. Late work will be penalized at a rate of 5% per day. If you feel that your circumstances justify an extension of the due date, contact me before the deadline.
Question 1
A central part of the Augustinian picture of language is the idea that the meaningfulness of language centrally involves representation – that is, that what is characteristic of a meaningful sentence is the possession of truth-conditions.
The first 80 sections of the Investigations contains a sustained attack on the Augustinian picture, including this aspect of it. What reasons to does Wittgenstein offer to reject this aspect of the picture? What does he replace it with?
Is the Wittgensteinian rejection of this aspect of the Augustinian picture convincing? Is there any way that one could respect the points that Wittgenstein makes while maintaining the representationalist picture? Aren’t there good reasons to hold on to the representationalist picture – think of Russell’s argument that we need the representationalist picture to make sense of the fact that we can understand the meaning of sentences we have not encountered before? Is there any way to make sense of this fact on the Wittgensteinian picture?
Question 2
In section 65, Wittgenstein imagines an interlocutor responding to his attempts to undermine the Augustinian picture of language by demanding that if Wittgenstein wants to reject that picture of the essence of language, he owes us a different account of what the essence of language is. Wittgenstein responds by saying that “these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use the same word for all – but they are related to one another in many different ways”. In sections 66-77, he explains what he means by that. What is the picture of concepts that he is rejecting? What reason does he offer to reject it? What picture of concepts does he offer in its place? How does it differ from the one he rejects?
Do you agree with Wittgenstein? Does he give us good reason to reject the traditional picture? Can one give necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept? If so, can one do it for all conceps? Does the family resemblance picture offer a plausible picture of concepts?
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Question 3
Section 141 marks the beginning of a long discussion of the ‘criteria’ we employ in ascribing understanding. Wittgenstein discusses the role that mental experience, explicit representation, and regularity of use play in our ascription of understanding to individuals in different situations.
In 182, Wittgenstein represents this discussion as shedding light on the grammar of ‘understands’? What does he mean by that? What does the discussion of criteria reveal about the language-game(s) involving ‘understands’? In section 183, he compares saying ‘Now I can go on’ in various contexts, with saying ‘Now I can walk’ in different contexs? What is the point of the comparison? He sums up the lesson by saying: “Now we must be on guard against thinking that there is some totality of conditions corresponding to the nature of each case…”. Why must we be on guard against that? Why is it important? If Kripke were to summarize this point by saying: Wittgenstein thinks that there are no facts about understanding, would this be accurate? Why or why not? Would it be fair to say that Wittgenstein was a behaviourist?
Question 4
Kripke sums up the positive part of the sceptical solution as follows:
“All that is needed to legitimize assertions that someone means something is that there be roughly specifiable circumstances under which they are legitimately assertable, and that the game of as- serting them under such conditions has a role in our lives.” (78)
Explain what Kripke takes the assertability conditions of meaning attributions are – what are the circumstances in which they are assertable? Make sure to distinguish the case of 1st-person meaning attributions from 3rd- person meaning attributions. Explain the pragmatic function that the language-game of attributing meanings is supposed to have in our practice.
Do the assertability conditions Kripke posits really capture our ordinary concept of meaning? Can we legitimize our use of the concept of meaning without supposing there are any facts about meaning? Does Kripke’s picture entail that group of speakers could not be wrong about whether an particular individual understands a word? If so, is this a problem?
Question 5
Wittgenstein often remarks that the point of his philosophy is not to answer philosophical questions. For example, section 255 says “The philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of an illness”. He seems to think that his job is to point out when philosophers’ temptation to theorize leads them to transcend the bounds of possible explanation (see, for example, sections 14 and 67). His style of posing questions and answering them is supposed to help the reader work through their confusions and come to see the philosophical questions as misguided, or based on false presuppositions.
How is this method supposed to work? Pick a particular example, and reconstruct how Wittgenstein tries to reveal confusions and to provide ‘therapy’ for philosophical questions. Do you think the method works? Is Wittgenstein’s picture of philosophy compelling.
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