Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and Donation for Planting Trees
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Description/Paper Instructions The topic is should we overcharge a customer who is in vulnerable situation. you can give a title to this topic on ur own. the course is philosophy…so one student took the topic “should we donate for planting more trees?” and gave own title related to philosophy” Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and Donation for Planting Trees” Aristotelian Virtue Ethics and Donation for Planting Trees Nasrin Sultana
[Abstract: Nature plays an instrumental role in our happy or flourishing life as we depend on nature for our food, clothing, shelter and so on. Moreover, wild animals are also instrumentally valuable for protecting the ecological balance; and hence their habitat, nature, should be protected. However, since the industrial revolution, nature has been profoundly affected by the emission of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. In this circumstance, as human beings what character traits should we dispose to face these challenges? Should we spend our wealth and time for protecting the nature, which is instrumentally valuable for present and future generations’ happy life, by donating and campaigning for planting trees? In this paper, I have tried to answer to these questions from the Aristotelian virtue ethical point of view. After explaining different aspects of the Aristotelian virtue ethics I have tried to conclude that in response to the debate of whether one should contribute to the tree plantation campaign or not, a virtuous person would go with donation and campaign for planting trees.]
Human beings are a part of nature. We and other species eat, drink, breathe and live in nature. So, nature has an instrumental value in human and other species’ lives. However, increasing deforestation, limitless emission of CO2 and other greenhouse gases do highly contribute to the climate change. As a result, some non-human species may become extinct and our future generations are at a risk. So, some philosophers agree that wild-species are necessary for protecting the ecosystem; and hence, their habitat should be protected. On the other hand, some philosophers claim that many wild-species do not play any significant instrumental role in human life, so we should not spend money on protecting their habitat. Now, the question arises: as human beings what character traits should we possess regarding this situation? Should we donate and campaign for planting trees to save the nature to ensure a safe earth for our future generation as well as a safe habitat for non-human species which are valuable for protecting ecosystem? In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle does not consider environment or nature instrumentally valuable for human flourishing. However, according to the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, environment and non-human species play an instrumental role in achieving biological, cultural, ecological and aesthetic goods which are constitutive elements of a happy life. In this paper, I will, first, explain different aspects of Aristotle’s virtue ethics, and then, try to conclude that in response to the debate of whether one should contribute to the tree plantation campaign or not, a virtuous person should go with donation and campaign for planting trees. For by donating and campaigning for planting trees one can cultivate the dispositions of courage, generosity, compassion, appreciation, gratitude, humility and so on.
In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle devotes himself into the inquiry of what virtue is. According to Aristotle, human beings seek happiness or eudaimonia. Everything we do and think is ultimately for attaining a happy or flourishing life. [1] For happiness is the complete good. By “complete good” he means a thing which is pursued for its own sake. Not all goods are complete goods. Some goods, “such as wealth, flute, in general, instruments”, are pursued for the sake of obtaining other goods. Thus, these are instrumental goods. [2] On the other hand, pleasure, health, friendship, and eudaimonia, a flourishing life are the things that are pursued for their own sake; and hence, these are complete or final or intrinsic goods. For according to Aristotle, we would choose each of these even though these had no further results. However, among these final goods some are pure final or more complete and some are constitutive. [3] The pure final goods are unconditional because these are pursued solely for their own sake. Aristotle says, … an end pursued in its own right is more complete than an end pursued because of something else, and that an end that is never choiceworthy because of something else is more complete than ends that are choiceworthy both in their own right and because of this end. Hence an end that is always choicworthy in its own right, never because of something else, is complete without qualification… Now happiness more than anything else seems complete without qualification. For we always choose it because of itself, never because of something else.[ 4] Thus, since happiness or eudaimonia is unconditionally good, i.e. it is pursued solely for its own sake, happiness is the pure final good. On the other hand, health, friendship, etc. are pursued for their own sake as well as for the sake of happiness. Thus, these are constitutive goods. [5] Now the question is: if constitutive goods, such as health, friendship etc. are pursued for the sake of happiness, are these goods instrumental for happiness? According to Jennifer Welchman’s interpretation, constitutive goods are not the means of a happy or flourishing life. Rather, they are the parts of what is to flourish as a human being. [6] For example, the materials, such as, gold, bronze or wood, that a sculpture is made of are the constitutive parts of the sculpture in question, whereas the instruments used in making that sculpture are the external parts to the sculpture. That is, the instrumental parts are the external—not internal constituents, of the sculpture, whereas the constitutive parts are the parts of its own. Similarly, instrumental goods are the external goods, whereas, constitutive goods, e.g. health, friendship, are the parts of the pure final good, e.g. eudaimonia, flourishing or happiness. According to Aristotle, happiness is not only complete, but also self-sufficient as happiness makes life choiceworthy and lacks nothing. [7] Thus, the definition of “happiness” or “flourishing” can be restated as follows: Happiness or flourishing is a complete and self-sufficient good because it is choiceworthy solely for its own sake; and hence it is the pure final good. or For any x, x is happiness or flourishing iff x is complete and self-sufficient and x is choiceworthy solely for its own sake; and hence x is the pure final good. Now the question arises: where does happiness consists in? According to Aristotle, happiness consists in the proper functioning of human soul. So, to determine the character traits essential for attaining a flourishing life, we need to analyze human nature—what kind of creatures human beings are. [8] To explain how human soul functions Aristotle makes a hierarchy of all living beings. According to him, all living beings can grow and reproduce but only animals and humans are conscious. He adds, a human soul has two faculties: rational and irrational. Human beings share the irrational faculty with animals and by the rational faculty they are different from animals. The most primitive element of irrational faculty is the vegetative element and this is responsible for nutrition and growth. The second tier of the soul is the appetitive part which is responsible for emotions and desires. This element is both rational and irrational. It is irrational in the sense that animals have desires and feelings. It is rational in the sense that although human beings have desires they have the ability to control their desires with the help of reason. This ability of human beings is called moral virtue. [9] The third tier of the soul is the calculative part which is purely rational. This element is responsible for the human ability to contemplate, to reason with deliberation and judgment. This ability to choose with deliberation and judgment is called intellectual virtue. [10] Thus, because of rational faculty human beings decide or choose with deliberation and judgment whereas animals seem to respond directly and instinctively. Since by possessing and exercising virtue we can attain goods for soul which are constitutive of a happy or flourishing life, virtue is the constitutive good in our happy or flourishing life. According to Aristotle, intellectual virtue arises and grows mostly from teaching whereas moral virtue or virtue of character results from habit and practice. For both kinds of virtue, there remains only one principle—the principle of mean. Virtue is the intermediate state between extreme and deficiency which exist at the end of a straight line.[ 11] And only a person having practical wisdom can determine the mean of that line.
In the previous section, we have reflected on the Aristotelian idea that virtue is the activity of human soul that makes a life happy or flourishing. A flourishing or happy life is complete and self-sufficient which is choiceworthy solely for its own sake. Virtue is the constitutive good of a flourishing life. Now a new question comes in: what is the role of nature in our flourishing life? It seems that according to Aristotle, nature is not a constitutive good in our happy or flourishing life; nor does it play any significant instrumental role in making our life happy or flourishing. So, why should we save nature for our future generation which does not have any instrumental value in our flourishing life? Moreover, some ethicists think that not all wild animals are instrumentally valuable in our life. [12] So, why should we devote our resources to protect their habitat that might otherwise have been spent on making us happier, e.g. on watching movies in a cinema hall or buying fashionable attires? To answer to these questions take a closer look at Aristotle’ theory once again. We have seen that Aristotle gives a hierarchy of different goods. Now consider Aristotle’s hierarchy of different goods, i.e. instrumental, constitutive and final goods. According to Aristotle, health is one of the constitutive goods of flourishing life. In order to have good health we need fresh air, pure water and food. However, since the industrial revolution nature has been profoundly affected by the burning of fossil fuels. Due to deforestation, the reckless emission of CO2 and other green-house gases, environment is getting polluted which is a hindrance to achieving good health. Thus, pure environment or nature plays an instrumental role in achieving constitutive goods, namely health. Again, since good health is the constitutive good of flourishing life and environment is the instrumental good of good health, environment, in turn, plays an instrumental role in achieving happiness which is the pure final good. A similar argument is provided by Professor Jennifer Welchman. She claims that a “flourishing human life is always partly determined by our species’ biological and psychological make-up. We do not flourish fully if we cannot obtain the instrumental goods of food and water.” [13] Thus, according to Welchman, to obtain the instrumental goods of food and water is the necessary condition for a fully flourishing life. On the other hand, watching movies in a theatre hall or wearing fashionable attires are not necessary for our happy or flourishing life. Nor are these sufficient for our flourishing life. For without fashionable attires we are quiet able to keep us warm in the winter; without watching movies in a cinema hall we are quite able to manage other sources of recreations that may require spending less money. Moreover, wild animals can be an alternative to watching movies as a source of recreation. However, there is no alternative to pure water and food. Thus, following Professor Welchman, it is our moral duty to save nature to obtain the instrumental goods of food, water and air. In addition to providing material goods, nature and wild animals provide cultural, recreational and aesthetic resources which are widely acknowledged as constitutive goods for human flourishing. [14] Hence, we should develop our capacities for feeling, choosing and acting well to protect them. However, a critic may argue that elements of recreation, culture and aesthetics vary from man to man and generation to generation. So, there is no guarantee that our future generation will equally like nature and wild animals as we do. [15] However, this claim may be rejected by the opposite claim that there is no guarantee that our future generation will not like nature or wild animals. Moreover, it may be the case that our future generation will like nature and wild animals more than we do. So, we cannot deprive them on the basis of an assumption that future generation may not find nature and wild animals culturally, aesthetically and recreationally valuable. Moreover, trees and animals are the parts of our ecological community and hence they are valuable for protecting the ecosystem. Paul Taylor claims that any living thing possesses inherent worth as a member of Earth’s community; and to recognise the living things as having inherent worth is to show respect for nature. He adds that the good of a non-human organism consists in the full development of its biological power. [16] Thus, the flourishing of things in nature is a constituent part of Earth’s community or ecological community. So, though some wild animals do not play any instrumental role directly in our flourishing life, they are necessary for protecting the ecological balance. Since we all depend directly or indirectly on the product of ecosystem; and a good ecosystem can help one to lead a happy or flourishing life; hence, all wild animals, in turn, are instrumentally valuable for achieving happiness. Now the answer to the question why we should spend our money and resources on protecting animal’s shelter, rather than on watching movies or buying fashionable dresses, is very simple. By human flourishing Aristotle means “the flourishing of our whole natures—rational, emotional, social, and purely physical” flourishing. [17]A virtuous person is just in her business transaction, generous in spending her wealth, courageous in saving her homeland. A virtuous friend is a person who cares for his friends’ goods. Good parents act for the sake of their children’s goods. [18] So, as social beings it is virtuous to be disposed to conserve wildlife and world ecosystem. That means, we should care for the goods of other members of the ecological community, as they are instrumentally valuable in our happy life. Moreover, if we spend money on making us happier, i.e. if we spend money on watching movies or buying fashionable cloths, we will only consider our wellbeing and happiness. And we will eventually ignore the wellbeing of our future generation. For we wear fashionable attire to make us look good, whereas a safe nature is required not only for us but also for other members of the earth as well as for our future generation. And a virtuous person cannot act like a selfish person who only considers her own wellbeing. Rosalind Hursthouse, a neo-Aristotelian ethicist, claims that virtue involves feelings and emotions. According to Hursthouse, virtue is a disposition of certain emotional reactions, finding certain things enjoyable and others painful or distressing. [19] She holds that virtues are the things that make their possessor a good human being. For, acting virtuously means “acting in accordance with reason… this will lead to eudaimonia. That means that the virtues benefit their possessor”. [20] It is discussed earlier that environment provides not only material goods, such as food, air and shelter, but also cultural, recreational and aesthetic resources which are constitutive elements of our flourishing life. Thomas Hill argues that failing to value the environment lies in the defects in character that are harmful for the agent. He claims that an agent who fails to appreciate the non-sentient nature reflects the character trait of ignorance, a lack of appreciation of his place in the nature, a lack of self-acceptance or a lack of aesthetic sensibility. [21] Thus, virtues toward environment can allow (benefit) us to enjoy these material, cultural, aesthetic goods which can lead us have a happy or flourishing life. So, it seems that though Aristotle’s virtue ethics does not directly discuss the character traits toward nature or environment, we can identify virtuous choices and actions regarding the environmental issues by following the neo-Aristotelian virtue theory. A virtuous person should choose to spend money on protecting the nature rather than on those, e.g. fashionable attire or watching movies, that are neither necessary nor sufficient for our happy or flourishing life. Now let me develop a list of virtues regarding the donation in response to tree plantation campaign. So far we have discussed, it is evident from the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics that nature and non-human species play an instrumental role in human flourishing. Thus, to donate or campaign for tree plantation reflects the character trait of recognition of the instrumental value of nature in our flourishing life. Moreover, by donating and planting trees we can cultivate the disposition of generosity, liberality, compassion, courage, and so on in terms of Aristotle’s virtue ethics, appreciation and gratitude toward nature in terms of the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Now consider how we can cultivate these dispositions by donating for planting trees. In giving and taking money, according to Aristotle, generosity is the mean between wastefulness and deficiency. [22] Liberality is the mean between giving and taking wealth. According to Aristotle, a liberal man is a man who gives to the right people, the right amount, and at the right time for the sake of the noble. [23] Thus, an environmentally generous and liberal person, i.e. virtuous person, knows how much money or wealth she should spend for protecting nature. Now let me explain how courage is related to donation for planting trees. In respect of courage, a person who “is afraid of nothing” and “goes to face everything” is a rash. [24] On the other hand, a person who “avoids and is afraid of everything” is a coward. [25] However, though all evils are bad, to fear some evil is not considered as cowardice activity in Aristotle’s account. For example, if a person fears disobeying his parents or insulting his elders or bad reputation, he is not a coward at all; and hence, to control such fears is not considered as courage. Similarly, though death is the most terrible in all evils, a courageous person doesn’t fear a noble death, e.g. death in a battle. [26] Thus, courage is not concerned with the lack of fear in all circumstances; nor is it concerned with the lack of confidence in all circumstances. Rather, courage is the proper attitude towards the feeling of confidence and feeling of fear. [27] Now come to the next question: what is meant by proper attitude? Ross, in respect of courage, suggests that Aristotle’s triad should be substituted by two dyads, [28] where rashness is the lack of fear and excessive in confidence; and cowardice is the lack of confidence and excessive in fear. That means that rashness is “not an opposite extreme to cowardice.”[29] Similarly, cowardliness is not an opposite extreme to rashness either. [30] Rather, rashness and cowardliness are two distinct variables which can vary independent of each other. So, a person who is confident to a right degree in a required circumstance is called a bravery or courageous person; and a person who fears something to a right degree is called cautious:
Thus, following Ross and Urmson, it is evident that a cautious person shows fear to something to a right degree and a bravery person shows sensibleness to something to a right degree in a given circumstance. For example, if a person doesn’t fear to go out in heavy snow fall, he is insensible and fearless. On the other hand, a person who doesn’t go out in a cold weather is over cautious. So, only a cautious and bravery person faces and fears the right things from the right motive, in the right circumstance. Similarly, an environmentally cautious and bravery person doesn’t fear spending money and wealth for protecting earth and global ecosystem, rather fears and shows the sensibleness to the result of environmental degradation and climate change, and hence acts virtuously as this is the right time to donate and campaign for planting trees to save the environment and ecosystem for world’s habitants. In addition to that we can cultivate the disposition of compassion by protecting the nature for future generation. For since compassion is a disposition of feeling toward others’ sufferings, we should be compassionate toward the sufferings of our future generation resulted from environmental degradation and ecological imbalance. Thomas Hill argues that human being should develop the disposition of humility toward nature. By “humility he means the recognition of the importance of non-sentient nature.” [34] Hursthouse argues that we can cultivate the disposition of wonder by aesthetic appreciation and gratitude toward nature for its beauty and abundance. Thus, aesthetic appreciation and extending gratitude toward nature are environmental virtues in Hill and Hursthouse’s account. For by recognizing the aesthetic value of nature and animals we can cultivate the disposition of appreciation. By planting trees to protect the nature we can also acknowledge the gifts of nature and hence we can cultivate the disposition of gratitude.
So far we have discussed that although Aristotle does not consider nature as instrumentally valuable in our human flourishing, according to the neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, nature and animals play an instrumental role in human flourishing. Thus, we should act virtuously to protect the nature for the wellbeing of existing and future generation by donating and campaigning for tree plantation rather than by spending money on things that are not necessary and sufficient for our flourishing life. For by donating and campaigning for tree plantation we can cultivate the disposition of generosity, liberality, compassion, courage, appreciation and gratitude toward nature. Since this is the right time to take the decision to use our time, wealth and labor properly to save the nature and make the earth habitable for future generation, by donating and campaigning for planting trees we can act virtuously and hence can be complete human beings who consider their own wellbeing as well as the future generation’s wellbeing. Bibliography
[1] Richard Burnor and Yvonne Raley, Ethical Choices: an Introduction to Moral Philosophy with Cases, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011, p.221 [2] Jennifer Welchman, “Environmental Stewardship, Biodiversity, and Liberal Neutrality” (an unpublished talk on January 27), Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, p. 4 [3] Ibid, p. 4 [4] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Terence Irwin, Trans., with Introduction, Notes and Glossary (2nd edition) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), reprinted in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, p. 10 [5] Jennifer Welchman, “Environmental Stewardship, Biodiversity, and Liberal Neutrality” (an unpublished talk on January 27), Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, 4-5 [6] Ibid, p. 5 [7] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Terence Irwin, Trans., with Introduction, Notes and Glossary (2nd edition) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), reprinted in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, p. 10 [8] Jennifer Welchman, “Aristotle: Introduction” in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, pp. 3-4 [9] James Fieser, Metaethics, Normative Ethics and Applied Ethics: Historical and Contemporary Readings, Wadsworth Thomson Learninig, Inc. 2000, p. 140 [10] Ibid, pp. 140-141 [11] Ibid. p. 141 [12] Jennifer Welchman, “Environmental Stewardship, Biodiversity, and Liberal Neutrality” (an unpublished talk on January 27), Department of Philosophy, University of Alberta, p. 4 [13] Ibid, p.5 [14] Ibid, p. 5 [15] Ibid. p. 6 [16] Paul Taylor, “The Ethics of Respect for Nature”, Environmental Ethics, Vol. 3, Issue 3, Fall 1981, p. 199 [17] Jennifer Welchman, “Introduction” in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, p. xx [18] Suanne E. Foster, “Aristotle and Environment”, Environmental Ethics, Vol. 24, Issue 4, Winter 2002, pp. 420-421 [19] Rosalind Hursthouse, “Environmental Virtue Ethics”, in Rebecca L. Walker & P. J. Ivanhoe (ed.) Environmental Ethics, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 160 [20] Nafsika Athanassoulis, “Virtue Ethics”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, retrieved on February 22, 2016 from http://www.iep.utm.edu/virtue/#H3 [21] Thomas E. Hill Jr, “Ideal for Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments” Environmental Ethics, Vol. 5, Issue 3, Fall 1983, p. 216 [22] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Terence Irwin, Trans., with Introduction, Notes and Glossary (2nd edition) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), reprinted in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, Book II, p. 30 [23] Aristotle, (Translated by W. D. Ross) Nicomachean Ethics, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999, p. 54 [24] Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Terence Irwin, Trans., with Introduction, Notes and Glossary (2nd edition) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), reprinted in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, Book II, p. 22 [25] Ibid, p. 22 [26] Aristotle, (Translated by W. D. Ross) Nicomachean Ethics, Batoche Books, Kitchener, 1999, Book III, pp. 43-44 [27] David Ross, Aristotle, Routledge, London and New York, 6th Edition, 1995, p. 214 [28] Ibid, p. 215 [29] J. O. Urmson, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 10, Number 3, July 1973, p. 229 [30] Aristotle says, “In some cases the deficiency, in others the excess, is more opposed to the intermediate condition. For instance, cowardice, not rashness, the excess, is more opposed to bravery…” (please see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, in Terence Irwin, Trans., with Introduction, Notes and Glossary (2nd edition) (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1999), reprinted in J. Welchman (ed.), The Practice of Virtue: Classic and Contemporary Reading in Virtue Ethics, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Cambridge, 2006, Book II, p. 32) [31] J. O. Urmson, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 10, Number 3, July 1973, p. 229 [32] J. O. Urmson, “Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean”, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 10, Number 3, July 1973, p. 229 [33] Ibid, pp. 229-230 [34] Thomas E. Hill, “Ideals of Human Excellence and Preserving Natural Environments”, Environmental Ethics, Vol. 5, Issue 3, Fall 1983, P. 220
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