Order ID | 53563633773 |
Type | Essay |
Writer Level | Masters |
Style | APA |
Sources/References | 4 |
Perfect Number of Pages to Order | 5-10 Pages |
In 2–3 pages, respond to ONE of the following questions (double spaced).
The questions are aligned with different sections of the text, with the premise that each topic is most centrally addressed in a specific segment. You can, and should, utilize information from any part of the text that is pertinent to the response.
Because this is a test rather than a paper, I will grade based on correctness rather than novelty. All of the questions, however, necessitate some thought; they cannot simply be read from the texts. Furthermore, the “correct” response is unavoidably a question of interpretation in many (if not all) circumstances: in these cases, it would be safer to repeat what I stated in class, but it will also be acceptable if you are clearly following some other fair interpretation. Of course, your response must be “original” in the sense that it is your own work, as is customary. (Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. Norman Kemp Smith (Palgrave Macmillan; 2nd edition, 2007) is the only outside source (ISBN: 0230013384).
If there are differences between the B and C editions, please base your answer on the B edition text. You can mention it using the page number from the B-edition (for example, “B112”).
Questions
1st (Preface)
Take a look at the following two definitions of “metaphysics”: (a) Metaphysics is concerned with our pure a priori knowledge of the world of experience — that is, what we know about the objects of experience that is not based on experience; and (b) metaphysics is concerned with causes and principles of the world of experience that are outside the realm of experience. Why does it appear that the book’s outcome will be good in terms of (a), informing us what we can hope to learn about metaphysics in that sense and how we can learn it, but entirely negative in terms of (b), simply telling us that we have no hope of learning it? Why, according to Kant, do we get a significant good result by discussing (b) as well?
2. Inventive+ phrasing (Introduction) Explain what it means to say that a judgment is analytic in two ways, using Kant’s example of “All bodies are extended”: first, by thinking of judgments in general as the application of predicates to subjects (so that the form of every judgment is something like “S is P”); second, by thinking of judgments in general as knowledge on a condition (so that the form of every judgment is something like “S is P”). Explain why Kant’s claim that “all bodies are heavy” is synthetic in the same two ways. Why does the understanding, in generating a second type of judgment (a synthetic judgment), need support from something else (“= X”), something other than the subject and predicate concepts? What external support is provided in the event of an empirical judgment like “All bodies are heavy”? Why is it strange, then, that some synthetic judgments are likewise a priori (according to Kant)?
3. If you’re looking for a (Aesthetic) Explain Kant’s distinction between (human) “intuitions” and “concepts” (in general; the exceptional case of pure intuition doesn’t need to be discussed in depth). Consider how intuitions and conceptions differ in terms of being solitary, instantaneous, passive representations and universal, mediate, active ones. Why, in Kant’s opinion, does knowledge of an empirical object have to include both of these modes of representation (intuitions and concepts)? What part does each one play? What role does feeling play in intuition, specifically? What does it mean when something “responds” to a sensation?
a. (Metaphysical Deduction) Explain how a simple empirical example (e.g., the concept cinnabar, which was discussed in class) must represent its object if it is to be suitable as a subject for: (a) a universal categorical judgment (e.g., “All cinnabar is red”); (b) a particular categorical judgment (e.g., “Some cinnabar is shiny”); (c) a singular categorical judgment (e Why does this show that the three moments of amount (unity, plurality, and totality) are categories, assuming that every empirical notion must contain these characteristics?